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focuses on risk sharing through sharecropping versus labour contracts). These papers do not, however, examine the interaction of sharecropping with futures markets, which is our topic.
In the next section we describe the basic economic setting. In Section II, we examine the advantage to share diversification in the absence of a futures market. Section III describes the conditions under which futures trading promotes share diversification. Section IV makes the share size endogenous, and Section V concludes the paper.
I. THE ECONOMIC SETTING
We examine a commodity market that is competitive and subject to independent supply and demand shocks. In order to capture in a simple way the notion that a producer's output depends partly on common influences (e.g. rain versus shine) and partly on influences specific to the producer or locality, we assume a linear form for the joint distribution of producers' outputs. Here fli is a constant, q may be viewed as a common 'factor' influencing the different growers' outputs, and gi is grower-specific, or idiosyncratic variability. By summing the individual outputs qi over producers i, we see that Q =_ Nq = E qi is aggregate output, so that q is the output of an average grower. The coefficient /3i represents the sensitivity of the output to common environmental influences.8 The best way to view the condition in (i) that the idiosyncratic components sum across growers to zero is that gi measures the level of a grower's output in comparative terms, after extracting all systematic fluctuations. For example, if in some states of nature the si's had a positive sum, this would indicate high output for all growers; however, such systematic fluctuations are reflected in q rather than in the idiosyncratic term e 9 Production costs are assumed to be zero, so that there is no distinction between crop-share and equity contracts. (The analysis could easily be extended to allow for a stochastic harvesting cost.) Let P be the spot price for the commodity. Then the ith grower's revenue is /3i Pq + Pgi. The two components of this sum may be termed systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk respectively. The systematic risk term /3i Pq is the revenue derived from the component of output that varies proportionately with aggregate output. The 8 The assumptions in (i) are similar to the requirements on security returns in Ross' (I978) work on separating distributions. An example satisfying this structure is a set of multivariate normally distributed outputs, where (i) may be interpreted as a 'market model' regression of qi on q.
' Note that by transforming variables, an output distribution in which the 'idiosyncratic' components sum to a random number can be converted into the form given here. The distribution is therefore less restrictive than initial appearances may suggest. Consider the representation qi = /3i ql + yq, where the yj's sum is stochastic. Then, by defining q--lq/iZ-1I^) + q1 and e1
-(/z-/ )S1 ) one obtains the output distribution (i).
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FUTURES VERSUS SHARE CONTRACTING idiosyncratic risk term Pgi is revenue derived from the component of output that is conditionally independent of aggregate output.'0 Henceforth, we suppress all tildes unless essential for clarity. Let w = PeC, the idiosyncratic term and let Z_ Pq, the systematic variable. Now cov (Z, wi) = o, as the equilibrium spot price P is a function of only q and the independent demand shock, so that ei is conditionally independent of P (as well as q)." Since the esi's sum to zero, (i) imposes negative dependence on the 6i's (i.e. pairwise covariances are typically negative). For example, if the e6's are identically and symmetrically distributed, o = cov (E i, E ei) = E -2 +2 E E Cip i j<i where 0-2 iS the common variance and oi, is the common covariance, so that
Furthermore, negatively correlated ei's typically imply negatively correlated w S.
12
We examine a scenario in which growers can sell fractional shares of their crops in advance to another firm (a processor). We assume that the growers and the processor are each endowed with a non-random initial wealth level W."3 Letting E be the expectation operator and C be consumption, we assume the common mean-variance preferences for all individuals v[E(C), var (C)] = E(C) --var (C).
2 This is a monotonic transformation of a Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function under the assumptions of constant absolute risk averse (exponential) utility and normality of consumption.'4 This specification of preferences causes risk premia to be proportional to variances and to absolute risk aversion, and thereby facilitates considerably our analysis of gains to particular risk sharing arrangements. The parameter A may be viewed as a measure of absolute risk aversion. In Section IV we examine the effect of reducing a processor's risk aversion relative to that of growers.
10 One can generalise the analysis to allow for a pure price risk term in the expression for grower revenues, so that output takes the form qi = ac + /3 q + ei, with Pac then representing pure price risk. We set ac equal to its 'typical' level of zero, i = I, .N. N, so that outputs are proportional in expectation. It is not hard to extend the analysis to allow for differing ai's; details are available from the authors. This entails ,k, fl2 > O (and restriction of the support of e1 and e2) to avoid the absurdity of negative expected output. Ideally, a highly risk averse grower might hedge by selling a substantial fraction of his output forward to several buyers. (Such a hedge must be adjusted by a long or short position taken to exploit any bias in the futures price as a predictor of the later spot price; see, e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz (I98I).) Alternatively, he may join a cooperative that divides profits among many growers. However, either alternative leads to an obvious incentive problem for a grower who retains only a small revenue share. In reality, growers typically sell shares to only one or a few buyers (e.g. USDA (I977)). Furthermore, when joint inputs from both processor and grower are required, a small share purchase may create a moral hazard problem on the part of the processor.'6 Relatedly, there is a potential free-rider problem in monitoring amongst processors that could weaken the incentive of the grower. (Goldsmith (I985) notes that monitoring of growers' inputs by the processor is required in 'coresatellite' arrangements.) Finally, sales of small shares to many processors may be deterred by fixed transaction costs per contract. In Section IV the share size is determined endogenously as a function of transaction costs. 15 If the processor could costlessly issue shares in turn, then he would have an incentive to act as a financial intermediary between growers and outside investors. We assume that equity issuance is costly, and treat the share purchaser as a single individual. 16 
II.2. Combining Two Output Shares
We will determine conditions under which share contracting is profitable, i.e. growers are willing to pay risk premia to remove shares s from each that are greater than the premium demanded by the processor to bear these combined gambles. To do so, we examine how variances, and therefore, risk premia, are affected by the share sales. Subtracting the acceptance from the removal premia then enables us to obtain conditions under which profitable diversification can occur. We stress that our concept of diversification involves combining imperfectly correlated gambles, rather than subdividing a fixed amount of wealth across an increasing number of gambles. Samuelson (i 963) first pointed out this distinction between diversifying by 'averaging' versus adding multiple independent gambles, and that adding gambles was not necessarily desirable for a risk averse individual. Diamond's (i 984) conditions on preferences describe when the diversification due to repeated added risks is preferable. These conditions are closely related to the Proper Risk Averse preferences of Pratt and Zeckhauser (i 987). Also, Lippman and Mamer (i 988) provide a general analysis of conditions in which adding many independent risks is desirable. Our analysis applies a tractable mean-variance framework. The assumption of mean-variance preferences with constant discounting for variance in expected utility (as in (3)) implies that individuals are precisely neutral with respect to combining independent gambles. Thus, the results offered here regarding the desirability of futures and share contracting do not derive primarily from preferences. Let V1 and V2 be the variances of two growers' revenues. The sum of the maximum premia they would pay to remove share s is ( The primary benefit from share contracting, diversification of idiosyncratic output risks, is reflected in the second and third terms of (7), and tends to rise with the dispersion of these risks, as reflected in owl andOW2, and declines with cov (w1, w2) (a negative covariance being more favourable to diversification). The first term represents the cost of combining shares, i.e. the possibility of an excessive concentration of systematic risk on the processor. This is best illustrated by the case of equal systematic risk, fl1 = AB2. In (7), the coefficient of o-2 then becomes fl2S(2-3s), so that for small purchases (s < 2/3), systematic risk is spread more evenly between the growers and the processor, increasing the benefit to share contracting. If s > 2/3, excessive systematic risk is loaded on the processor, reducing the benefit to share transacting. The special case s = I can be viewed as lateral integration, that is, combining the revenues of two growers. The concentration of systematic risk is especially severe in this case. 17 When systematic risks are unequal, ,/ * ,82, the gain to share contracting may be greater. For example, if s = 2/3, the coefficient of o-2 becomes 2 (fl, + f2)2/ 9 > o, whereas with equal systematic risk, the gain was zero. The third term in (7) is positive when cov (w1, w2) < o (the typical case), indicating a further benefit to share contracting, diversification of idiosyncratic risk. The first term, due to systematic risk, is positive, favouring diversification so long as 2/ (m + I) > s. For small m, the advantage to growers of removing part of their systematic risk outweighs the cost to the processor unless the share purchase is large. However, if the processor buys from many growers the cost of loading systematic risk on a single party becomes dominant, deterring share diversification. The second and third terms reflect the advantage of diversifying idiosyncratic risk. The second term is always non-negative, and the third tends to be non-negative, since the pairwise covariances are typically negative. For commodities for which no futures market is available, an empirical implication of Proposition 2 is that multiple share contracting should be more extensive in localities whose outputs have low correlation with the market price, as these regions have relatively high idiosyncratic risk and low systematic risk.
II.3. Combining Many Output Shares

III. THE EFFECT OF FUTURES TRADING
Many small growers do not trade futures, possibly because of the setup costs of learning to use the futures market. If a larger processor is more prepared to do so, then there is an immediate benefit to forward contracting (a private arrangement to sell in advance either crop shares or a fixed quantity at a prespecified price) with processors, who can act as intermediaries for growers in their futures hedging activity. This paper seeks to explain why futures markets can promote share diversification even when growers and processors have symmetric access to futures markets.
The opportunity to hedge in a futures market changes the incentives for share diversification, because futures contracts do not serve equally well for hedging different types of risk. A grower who is endowed with the revenue distribution /3i Pq + Pei can partly hedge his systematic revenue risk (/3i Pq) but cannot hedge his idiosyncratic risk (Pei) by using the futures market. The idiosyncratic risk Pei is unhedgeable because it is uncorrelated with the payoff on a futures contract P-0, where 0 is the futures price.'8
The point we seek to illustrate in this section is as follows. When share contracting increases the sum of the variances (including growers and the processor) of hedgeable risks above the sum of the hedgeable variances of the separate producers, futures trading encourages share contracting. This can easily occur, because shares large enough to adequately diversify idiosyncratic risk may be too large from the point of view of evenly spreading systematic risk.
In the next subsection, we describe optimal futures positions for a grower or processor, either with or without share contracting. This prepares us to examine the gains to share diversification when a futures market is available. We examine share purchases first from two and then from many growers in Section III.2 and Section III.3 respectively. 18 However, share contracts are not ideal for the purpose of intermediated futures hedging, as they provide the processor with an incentive to hedge only the share that he purchases. Futures hedging via processors could be effected more fully through fixed-quantity forward contracts, in which the grower sells forward an optimal quantity which the processor can then offset with a short position on the futures market. futures risk premia), within the framework of this paper, the third term in (i o) has no effect on the difference in total variance with and without shares, and is uncorrelated with any of the other terms. Furthermore, just as with Z, the hedged systematic risk Z' is uncorrelated with idiosyncratic risk wi. Hence, the expression for the gains to share diversification has the same form as (7) with Z replaced by Z'. Intuitively, a processor who purchases revenue distribution bi Pq + c1 Pei will also acquire the futures position given by (9) to hedge his share purchase, so the effective systematic risk becomes Z'. We therefore have PROPOSITION 3 Share Diversification with Futures When afutures market exists, share diversification is profitable if and only if (7) holds with Z replaced by Z'.
As each grower hedges to offset movements in Z, -, < cr2.19 It follows that COROLLARY to Proposition 3 Complementarity of Futures with Shares Share contracting is more profitable with futures trading than without if and only if (fl2 + @2 ) S ( I-S-o S2 S< O.(II)
Proposition I of Section II showed that if the share purchase is high, then variability of common risk, 02, is a deterrent to combining risks. Proposition 3 and its Corollary imply that futures hedging, by reducing common risk, can increase the gain to growers and processors of share contracting. Within the context of our (partial equilibrium) analysis, the introduction of a futures market benefits growers and processors even without share contracting by improving risk sharing; but in addition, it can increase the incremental benefit to share contracting.
To interpret (i i) further, consider the case /l = fl2 so that condition (i i)
implies that fl2s(2 -3s) < o. This obtains so long as s > 2/3. Hence, for a sufficiently large share purchase, futures trading promotes share contracting. Section II described how share diversification is deterred by high output sensitivities (fli) relative to idiosyncratic risk, if only large shares can be purchased. As futures contracts are useful to hedge against systematic but not unsystematic risk, futures trading reduces the cost of share diversification without sacrifice of the benefits in idiosyncratic risk reduction.20
III.3. Combining Many Shares with Futures Trading
The tendency of futures trading to be complementary with share contracting increases when the shares of several rather than just two growers can be combined. For a given size of the share purchase, multiple purchases involve If m is large, then futures trading will promote share contracting even if shares are small, because the variance of systematic risk is a convex function of ,8. Purchasing more shares raises the processor's sensitivity to systematic output risk, so that the variance and acceptance premium rises disproportionately; when purchasing from many growers, the value to reducing this risk through the futures market increases.
The complementarity of futures and share contracting should be strongest for commodities with highly elastic or inelastic demand, as this preserves variability in Z. For near unitary elastic demand, output shocks tend to be offset closely by price, leading to little systematic revenue variability. For grains, however, inelastic demand is the norm.
A qualification to the analysis is that the presence or absence of a futures market may affect the size of share purchases, s. With the share purchase endogenous, the condition from Proposition 4, s* > 2/(m+ I), where s* is the optimal share purchase in the absence of a futures market, is sufficient for the complementarity of futures trading with share contracting. This condition is not necessary, however, since the gain to share contracting with futures is increased when the share size can be adjusted. In Section IV, we solve for the size of the optimal share purchases in.the presence and absence of a futures market and develop a milder sufficient condition for futures to promote share contracting.
IV. THE OPTIMAL SHARE PURCHASE
In the preceding sections, the size of the share purchases has been taken to be exogenous, as was the number of growers from whom the processor buys shares. In this section, these are both determined as part of a market equilibrium. We will see that futures and share contracting will typically be complementary even when the share size is endogenous. 
IV. i. Optimal Shares without Futures Trading
Let there be N identical growers and L identical processors, N > L. Each of the growers and processors is endowed with an initial wealth W. We assume that processors and growers behave competitively in their share transactions and that entry is prohibitively costly. We further assume that the revenues of all growers are identically distributed with common systematic risk parameter ,8, common idiosyncratic variance o2 and common covariance oij given by (2). Let X be the amount that a processor pays each grower from whom he purchases a share. We assume that transaction costs faced by processors engaging in share contracting have two components: a per-grower component t1 and a fixed component t0.21 These costs are identical across processors. Let m be the number of growers with whom one processor transacts. The processor maximises his expected utility subject to the constraint that each grower with whom he contracts achieves a reservation level of utility Ur (also identical across growers) after transacting. We assume that each grower can achieve an 'autarky' level of expected utility Ua without engaging in any share contracting. However, competition by processors might, in equilibrium, cause the growers' reservation utility Ur to exceed Ua.
The choice variables for a processor are the number of growers contracted with m, the size of the share purchase s, and the side-payment X. Without loss of generality, s and X are assumed to be identical across the identical growers. Let m* and s* be the locally optimal values of m and s obtained from the system of first order conditions with respect to m, s, and X and subject to the constraint (I 3) arising from the above problem. We will say that a processor 'profits' from share contracting if his expected utility from share contracting in (I 2) exceeds his autarky utility of W. If the fixed transaction cost to is sufficiently high, the locally optimal m* and s* will yield negative profits. Hence, the global optimum is either m = o if this occurs, or else is m*, s*. Thus, the nature of the equilibrium depends on the levels of the two transaction cost components to and t1. We begin our analysis of the maximisation problem (I 2) by solving for the (locally) optimal share purchase s* given that m = m*. Substituting for Xfrom (I 3) into (I 2) and setting the partial derivative with respect to s of the resulting The value of to does not influence the locally optimal m*, s*. On the other hand, m* is a decreasing function of t1 and of Ur, as is evident after substituting for X from (I 3) into (I 2). Three classes of equilibria that arise are described in the Appendix. In brief, these cases are: (i) No share contracting takes place (the cost -t1 is too large), (2) some but not all growers engage in share contracting (t1 falls in an intermediate range), and (3) all growers engage in share contracting (t1 is sufficiently low). In both Cases 2 and 3, if share contracting is profitable, then substituting the equilibrium m* into (I4) gives the equilibrium share purchase s*.
IV.2. Optimal Shares with Futures Trading
Let m* as before refer to the optimal number of growers contracted with in the absence of futures trading, given that share contracting takes place. The (locally) optimal m* is the solution to a quadratic equation (provided in the Appendix) with rather complicated coefficients. For simplicity we initially constrain m = m* and Ur to be unchanged with the introduction of futures. This provides a lower bound to the increased benefit of share contracting brought about by futures trading. We then provide a numerical example which shows that the ability to vary m can dramatically increase the gains to share contracting when a futures contract is introduced.
Given the above constraints, the optimal share S* is given by (I 4), with o2 replaced by -2 . Hence, by (8) An implication of the analysis is that one may expect share contracting to become more widespread following the introduction of futures. One can also identify which growers are more likely to enter share contracts after introduction of a futures market. In the absence of futures trading, share contracting will tend disproportionately to involve growers with unusual output distributions, e.g. with low or negative sensitivities to systematic factors. Combining low-sensitivity distributions (or negative-sensitivity distributions with positive-sensitivity distributions) takes greatest advantage of idiosyncratic risk diversification while minimising the concentration of (or even diversifying) systematic risk. Examples are growers who farm on deviant locations (e.g. hill vs. valley) or use deviant technologies (e.g. fertilisers or pesticides that offer differing protection across states of nature). This phenomenon is predicted to be strongest in commodities with highly elastic or 22 The other estimates were derived as follows. By (i), the typical value for /3 is unity. The value for oJ2IoJ2 is roughly consistent with the regressions of county on national output ofJohnson (I 
PROPOSITION 6 Differing Risk Aversion of Growers and Processors
There exist exogenous parameter values under which the complementarity offutures with share contracting is strengthened when the riAk aversion of the processor is reducedfrom a starting point at which growers and processors are equally risk averse.
V. CONCLUSION
A processor who purchases crop shares at a pre-specified price from multiple growers can pool idiosyncratic output risk. When the contemplated share purchases are large, the unhedged systematic (common) components of output risk act to deter extensive risk-pooling. As futures payoffs are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic risks and highly correlated with market-wide output variability, suggested that sharecropping (as distinct from share contracting with a processor) was discouraged by the development of modern risk-sharing markets because 'landlords and workers (to the extent that they had capital), could diversify their portfolio [which] meant that the relative importance of sharecropping as a risk sharing arrangement declined'. Modern capital markets have reduced the cost of equity issuance, which would indeed substitute for sharecropping. The reduced cost of equity issuance may also help to explain why sharecropping is more prevalent in less-developed countries (LDC's), which tend to have less-developed equity markets. At the same time, the existence of equity markets makes the prevalence of (non-rental forms of) share contracting in advanced economies more puzzling. Our analysis implies that, insofar as futures contracts are complementary with share contracting, the active futures markets available in developed countries may have helped maintain the viability of share contracting.23 Furthermore, an empirical implication of our analysis is that the introduction of futures in LDC's would enhance the extent of sharecropping in such countries because of the complementarity of futures with share contracting and sharecropping.
Our model may also help to explain why we do not observe contracts depending on aggregate as well as individual output that might appear to be desirable from a risk-sharing point of view. A processor could, for example, write a contract with several growers agreeing to purchase the idiosyncratic components of their outputs, which could be extracted since aggregate output is observable. This would pool idiosyncratic risks without loading large amounts of systematic risk onto the processor. When a futures market is present, the benefits of this arrangement can largely be obtained by combining two more familiar contracts: share purchases by a processor who then sloughs off part of his systematic risk on the futures market.
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